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Abstract 
This article analyses the current situation of discrimination towards foetuses 
with Down syndrome in Spain, both legally and through the medical practice, 
pointing out how this discrimination breaches the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), ratified by Spain, according 
to the Committee of the CRPD.   
This work argues that an eventual modification of the Spanish abortion 
legislation (in appeal before the Constitutional Court) might not be enough to 
prevent the said discrimination due to the emergence of the non-invasive 
prenatal testing (NIPT). It explores the challenges introduced by the non-
invasive prenatal testing and the relationship between a prenatal diagnose of a 
disability (DS in particular) and termination of pregnancy rates. Health 
practitioners, mainly through the communication of the diagnose, play a 
significant role in the bias against the Down syndrome population that leads to 
discrimination. Consequently, this article suggests the need for a different 
approach towards a DS diagnose, more accurate, positive and based on the 
actual experience of individuals with DS and their families.  
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Mission Impossible?  Preventing discrimination on grounds of 
disability of foetuses with Down syndrome in Spain after the 
emergence of non-invasive prenatal testing 
 
Introduction 
Unborn children with Down Syndrome (DS) have been discriminated in Spain on grounds of their 
disability since 1985. The Criminal Code considered the abortion an offence unless there were 
special circumstances, one of them being the risk of ‘serious mental or physical disabilities’ in 
the foetus, where termination prior to the 22nd pregnancy week would not be considered 
punishable.  
In current Spanish legislation regarding termination of pregnancy (TOP), Act 2/20101, 
abortion at request of the pregnant woman is considered a right (within the fundamental rights in 
the field of sexual and reproductive health) if performed in the first fourteen weeks of the 
pregnancy. An extended deadline is given in case there is a ‘risk of serious anomalies in the 
foetus’ and no time-limit when ‘an extremely serious an incurable illness is detected in the foetus’ 
(art. 15).  
Having ratified the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with a Disability 
(CRPD) in 2007, the Act 2/2010 is in breach of this international commitment. The Committee 
on the CRPD accordingly recommended in 2011 ‘that the State party abolish the distinction made 
in Act 2/2010 in the period allowed under law within which a pregnancy can be terminated based 
solely on disability’2. Again, very recently, the Committee expressed its concerns about ‘the lack 
of progress to implement the previous recommendations of the Committee to abolish legal 
provisions that reinforce a negative perception of disability by providing for the late termination 
of pregnancy based on foetal impairment’3 and therefore recommended to ‘abolish any distinction 
by law to the period within which a pregnancy can be terminated based on a potential foetus 
impairment (…), as these contribute to a climate of stigma against disability that can lead to 
discrimination.’4 
Nine years after the Act 2/2010 (that has remained unchanged despite the CRPD Committee 
Reports) we are facing a new challenge regarding the discrimination of foetuses on grounds of 
disability: the misuse of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT). Designed to detect chromosomal 
abnormalities, and DS in particular (Gil et al., 2015) through a simple blood test in the early weeks 
of the pregnancy they are having a radical influence in the increase of terminations of DS foetuses.  
Globally, selective abortion rates are 60-90 percent when a foetus is diagnosed DS. In some 
countries such as Iceland (Klucznik and Slepian, 2018) and Denmark5, the rates are already near 
100 percent. In France (Dommergues et al., 2010) and in England (Morris and Springett, 2014), 
environ 90% of diagnosed foetuses with DS end up as TOP. In the US, the rate is around 65-75% 
(Natoli, 2012).  In Spain, it is nearly 95% (Vargas Aldecoa, 2015). 
The rate of babies born with DS in Spain has radically decreased. The figures’ evolution runs 
in parallel to the changes to abortion legal provisions: before 1985 (when TOP was decriminalised 
under certain circumstances such as serious defects in the foetus) there were 14.78 babies with 
DS per every 10,000 newborns. After 1985 and before the radical modification of the abortion 
legislation in 2010, the rate was 9.93 per 10,000 newborns. In 2011 this rate decreased to 4.84 
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(Bermejo et al., 2012, p. 93). This is due to the increase of TOP of foetuses with DS and the 
improvement in the prenatal screening techniques (Bermejo et al., 2011, p. 105).  
The object of this paper is to raise awareness of the current discrimination on grounds of 
disability for foetuses with DS in Spain both legally and through the medical practice and to 
reflect on how to prevent the aforementioned discrimination. We are going to focus on the Spanish 
scenario but many of our conclusions might be valid for other countries with a similar abortion 
legislation or practice. 
First, we will briefly present the evolution of the prenatal testing in order to understand the 
challenges presented by the new NIPT. Second, we will show some figures about the rate of 
terminations of diagnosed DS foetuses. Third, we will explain the current Spanish legislation and 
practice concerning selective termination on grounds of a DS diagnose and we will analyse the 
most likely scenarios in the near future. Finally, we will reflect on what can be done to avoid 
selective terminations that constitute discrimination on grounds of disability. 
It should be noted that this paper is drafted from a legal perspective. However, it is also drafted 
from the perspective of a mother of a child with DS, whose personal experience has undoubtedly 
enriched her views about the rights of people with disabilities. 
 
Evolution of prenatal testing 
Although this study aims to assume a legal perspective, it is necessary to offer a brief scientific 
explanation of the different available prenatal techniques. While the traditional diagnostic 
techniques require to be performed at a later stage of the pregnancy, the NIPT offer a much earlier 
detection of foetal anomalies, in particular DS, with a similar accuracy. This is highly relevant as 
eventually removing the discrimination in law towards foetuses with disabilities might not be 
enough to prevent it: women who are given an accurate rate of a foetal anomaly likelihood in the 
early weeks of the pregnancy might decide to terminate on these grounds and they could do so 
within the general deadline without stating the cause. This is the main challenge of the NIPT 
regarding disability-related abortion, others including its misconception as a safer alternative to 
diagnostic techniques and its cost, which makes the inclusion of these techniques into the routine 
pregnancy screening tests not unthinkable. 
There are two main categories of prenatal techniques (Collins and Impey, 2012): the invasive 
techniques: chorion biopsy, amniocentesis, foetal blood sampling, biopsy of foetal tissue and 
embryofetoscopy, and the non-invasive techniques: ultrasound, Doppler, maternal blood 
(biochemical markers) and maternal blood (cell-free fetal DNA or cffDNA). Each of them shall 
be performed at specific times throughout the gestational period. An important distinction must 
be made regarding the nature of the techniques: while the prenatal diagnostic techniques allow us 
to identify foetal anomalies such as DS, the screening techniques only allow to suspect a possible 
foetal anomaly, that is, the likelihood of the foetus of being affected by the considered anomaly 
(American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2019). 
In order to accurately diagnose DS (99.9%) the most common technique is the amniocentesis 
which has a 2% risk of miscarriage. 
Being non-invasive, the screening tests are safer (no risk at all), although they only allow us 
to detect the risk of the foetus to have DS. The accuracy depends on the kind of screening, 
combining two or more techniques.    
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In Spain the routine screening test performed to detect DS combines an ultrasound (to measure 
nuchal translucency thickness and nasal bone) and maternal blood test (to detect human chorionic 
gonadotropin and pregnancy-associated plasma protein-A). It allows to detect more than 90% of 
the foetuses with DS, being the false-positive rate around 2.5% (Gracia Manzano, 2017). Those 
women who have a positive result are offered further testing to accurately diagnose the anomaly 
(mainly amniocentesis).  
However, prenatal genetic screening has changed dramatically in the last few years, driven 
primarily by the introduction of cell-free DNA (cfDNA) testing into clinical practice in 2012 
(Gray and Wilkins-Haug, 2018): it is a non-invasive technique consisting in a simple blood test 
taken in the first trimester of the pregnancy. It uses ‘massively parallel sequencing analysis of 
cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) in maternal plasma, which contains cffDNA originating from the 
trophoblast mixed with cell-free maternal DNA’ (Petersen et al., 2017, p.691e1). Initially, four 
commercial labs offered cffDNA testing, with detection rates for trisomy 21 of 99%, trisomy 18 
of 97–99% and trisomy 13 of 80–99% (Gray and Wilkins-Haug, 2018).   Focusing on DS, the 
false positive rate (FPR) is 0.1%, meaning that the cfDNA test is positive for an abnormality in 
0.1% of the cases but the foetus is later determined to be unaffected. Furthermore, according to 
studies developed in the UK (Gil et al., 2016, p.48), the FPR is as low as 0.03%: ‘If cfDNA testing 
had been confined to screening for trisomy 21, the FPR would have been 0.03% (1/3564)’. Based 
on these data, it has been argued that its accuracy detecting this chromosomal abnormality is very 
similar to very precise diagnostic invasive techniques such as amniocentesis but entraining no 
risk and hence ‘it has been advertised repeatedly in the press as the method to replace 
amniocentesis’ (Borrell and Stergiotou, 2015, p. 508). According Borrell (2018), this 
misconception of cfDNA as a safer alternative to amniocentesis is based on its commercial name 
(NIPT) and it has been used for marketing purposes, implying invasive procedures will not be 
required. Most experts (within them, Gray and Wilkins-Haug, 2018; Petersen et al., 2017; Smith 
et al., 2014) agree, however, that NIPT cannot replace diagnostic invasive techniques to confirm 
foetal chromosomal disorders. Besides, the NIPT have been correctly validated for trisomy 21 
singleton foetuses (99%) but not for twins and are not able to detect other aneuploidies (Borrell, 
2018; Gray and Wilkins-Haug, 2018).  
The cfDNA tests present a side consequence: the so-called “hidden losses”: ‘Pregnancy 
termination without karyotype confirmation has been reported in 6-20% of cfDNA positive 
results, decreasing to a 4% in cases with normal ultrasound.’ (Borrell, 2018, p. 6).  
The NIPT could soon become the first-line screening test for all women (Gray and Wilkins-
Haug, 2018). In 2018, cfDNA primary screening has been implemented in the public health 
system in Netherlands and Belgium, while it was introduced as second tier screening in 
Finland and Denmark, and as contingent screening in Switzerland (Borrell, 2018). It has also 
been introduced in the NHS Wales as an alternative to invasive procedures6 and as an 
additional option to women with singleton pregnancies who are deemed at higher chance 
following the combined or quadruple screen in England7. In France, under certain conditions, 
women are refunded the cost of the NIPT8. 
In Spain, the public health system is decentralized. Most Autonomous Communities offer the 
NIPT to women in high risk of a foetal chromosomal abnormality in order to reduce the number 
of invasive and riskier techniques but not as a primary screening test available universally.  
NIPT can also be accessed privately at a cost of about 500 euros. This cost has been highlighted 
by the academia, thus considering them not to ‘be used as the primary screening method within 
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normal pregnancy population’ (Vicie et al., 2017, p. 733). However, it has been argued that ‘using 
empirical data on uptake of testing, we have shown that NIPT can be provided effectively, and 
without increasing costs, as part of a publicly funded national DS screening pathway with the 
provision of NIPT testing in a public sector laboratory’ (Chitty et al., 2016, p. 11). In this scenario, 
it seems very likely that NIPT will be included as part of the routine screening tests for every 
pregnant woman.  
 
Down syndrome diagnoses and termination of pregnancies  
Prenatal testing has both advantages and disadvantages. Knowing the foetus condition can help 
the expectant parents to prepare themselves for the special needs their baby may have. Also, some 
conditions can be treated before birth or shortly after. In contrast, most genetic disorders cannot 
be treated or corrected, and a positive result may cause anxiety to the prospective parents. On our 
view the most important disadvantage of these prenatal tests is the clear relationship between 
diagnosed genetic disorders and TOP rates in the assumption that a life with a disability is less 
worth to be lived. Let us remember that some scientists consider ‘immoral’ not to abort a 
diagnosed DS baby and simply suggest “Abort it and try it again” (Dawkins, 2014).  
As the International Bioethics Committee (IBC, 2015) has pointed out: ‘screening is only 
justified if the usefulness of the intervention has been proven, and the advantages for the 
participants clearly outweigh the disadvantages’ (par. 87). ‘The situation is different when the 
purpose is not health gain but to decide, according to many domestic legislations, whether to 
carry a pregnancy to term, as it may be the case with serious foetal abnormalities. lf they carry 
to term, it allows those involved to prepare for the birth of a sick or disabled child. lf they do not, 
they avoid giving birth to a sick or disabled child’ (IBC, 2015, par. 88).  
Jotkowitz and Zivotofsky (2010, p. 149) highlight that: ‘While not all prenatal testing done 
for conditions that currently have no prenatal therapeutic intervention are performed for the sake 
of abortion, the vast majority are. This has resulted in a large decrease in the birth incidence of DS 
(…) If the new tests are safer for the fetus, less invasive for the woman, and provide a diagnosis 
earlier in the pregnancy, possibly even before the woman begins to ‘‘show’’, there is every reason 
to believe that the percentage of abortions for conditions such as DS, deafness, and dwarfism, will 
only rise’.  
It has been argued that prenatal screening tests are widely used with the eugenic purpose of 
decreasing the population presenting chromosomal abnormalities such as DS (who are the main 
population targeted) and even to make the population with DS disappear. This fear has been 
pointed out both from the academia (Skotko, 2009) and from organisations representing people 
with DS (for instance, at the congress “A world without DS?” held in March 2017 and active ever 
since9). In the UK there is a social media campaign called “Don’t screen us out”, ‘supported by a 
collection of people with DS, families and DS advocate groups’ that ‘have come together to 
highlight the serious concerns around the introduction of second-line cfDNA screening in the 
UK’10. 
Let us bear in mind that ‘the risk of a DS baby increases sharply with age’ (Jotkowitz and 
Zivotofsky, 2010, p. 148). As the maternal age at the time of conception has increased in Europe 
in the last 20 years, there has been an increase of 10% of number of pregnancies with DS (World 
Health Organisation, 2018). ‘However, development and the increasingly widespread practice of 
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prenatal screening followed by TOP have resulted in stable live birth prevalence’ (Vicie et al., 
2017, p.731).  
The figures of abortion following a DS diagnose have already been shown and they reveal 
the dimension of the issue object of this paper. Let us be reminded that in many European 
countries, included Spain, the rate is environ 90%. 
 
The Spanish legislation and medical practice 
The abortion legislation regarding foetuses with a disability 
In this section we are presenting the Spanish legislation regarding abortion of foetuses with a 
physical or intellectual impairment in order to show that since abortion was first decriminalised 
in Spain, the Spanish legislation has been discriminatory against unborn children presenting an 
impairment such as Down syndrome. We will argue this constitutes a breach of international 
treaties, mainly the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
There are two moments to be considered regarding the topic of this study:   
 
The Criminal Code from 1985. In 1985, for the first-time abortion was decriminalised in 
Spain if performed under certain circumstances. One of them was the presence of ‘serious 
physical or mental problems in the foetus’. This modification of the Criminal Law was contested 
before the Constitutional Court on the basis that art. 15 of the Spanish Constitution states: ‘All 
have the right to life’. Although the Constitutional Court (CC) ruling considered it to be 
constitutional, it is worth highlighting the following: first, the Court recognizes: 
‘the life of the unborn child, (…) is a legal right constitutionally protected by art. 15 of our 
fundamental regulation. (…) this protection which the Constitution dispenses to the unborn child 
implies two obligations for the State in general terms: that of refraining from interrupting or 
hindering the natural gestation process, and that of establishing a legal system for the defence of 
life (…). This does not mean that said protection needs to be absolute; in fact, as occurs with all 
constitutionally recognised rights, in specific cases it may and even should be subject to 
restrictions, as we shall see below. (…)’11.  
Secondly, the CC found that the presence of a serious defect in the foetus could justify a 
restriction to the right to life of the unborn child. The argumentation of the CC is based on the 
personal and economic burden prospective parents could experience should the child be born with 
a serious defect. This reasoning has contributed to a climate of stigma against disability, by 
highlighting the challenges of parenting a child with a serious defect or disability: The CC 
considered ‘that the use of a criminal penalty would entail the imposition of a conduct which 
exceeds what is normally required of a mother and the family. The previous statement takes into 
account the exceptional situation in which parents find themselves, and in particular the mother, 
and which is frequently aggravated in many cases by a lack of state and social provisions which 
would contribute significantly to mitigating the assistance requirements of the case and to 
removing the insecurity inevitably felt by the parents with regard to the fortunes of the affected 
child, given the seriousness of its condition in the event of survival (…) insofar as progress is 
made in enforcing preventive policy and in the generalisation and intensity of the assistance in a 
social State (…) this will decisively contribute to preventing the situation on which 
decriminalisation is based’12.  
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The Act 2/2010. The Act 2/2010 meant a radical change concerning the abortion provisions 
in Spain. Far from not being considered a crime, it is currently considered a fundamental right of 
the woman if performed in the first 14 weeks of the pregnancy. This consideration as a 
‘fundamental’ right of the woman plays a vital role since the Act 2/2010 states that it prevails 
over the protection that a prenatal life has right to (and though expressly recognizing prenatal life 
as a legally protected interest). The right to abort at the request of the pregnant woman is thus 
included within the fundamental rights concerning the sexual and reproductive health (art. 1 Act 
2/2010). Beyond the first 14 weeks of pregnancy abortion can be legally performed if the foetus 
has ‘serious impairments’ (until the 22nd week) or an ‘extremely serious incurable illness’ (no 
deadline), art. 15 Act 2/2010. 
 
The breach of international treaties  
Validly concluded international treaties form part of the Spanish internal legal order since they 
are officially published in the Spanish Official State Gazette (art. 96.1 Spanish Constitution). 
Once they become part of the domestic legal order, the supremacy of the international treaties 
over non-constitutional domestic provisions has been expressly recognized by the Spanish 
Constitution (art. 96) and by the Act 25/2014 (art. 31), as required by the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties (art.27).  
As a matter of course, Spanish courts apply international treaties provisions13, having 
recognized that individuals may rely on them to invoke direct rights should them be drafted in 
precise, complete and unconditional terms (Paniagua Redondo 1991, p. 925).  
Spain’s ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was 
published on the Boletín Oficial del Estado num. 96 on April the 21st 2008, long before the entry 
into force of the Act 2/2010. As we have described, the Act 2/2010 provides an extended deadline 
to perform an abortion where the foetus presents a serious impairment. This clearly goes against 
the CRPD. First of all, because from a rigorous application of the treaties interpretation rules 
according to the 1969 Vienna Convention it is evident that the right to life should be protected to 
every ‘human being’ (art. 10 CRPD) ‘on an equal basis with others’ (Rodríguez Díaz, 2017, p. 
414) and therefore, in every stage of the life of the human being, also prenatal life, equal treatment 
re the said protection should be granted: unborn foetuses with disabilities should enjoy their right 
to life ‘on an equal basis’ with foetuses without disabilities.  
Secondly, as Palacios argues, the breach of the CRPD by art. 15 of Act 2/2010 is manifest 
regardless of the non-consideration of the foetus as a person under Spanish domestic law14 
(Palacios, 2010, p. 55): the CRPD not only forbids discrimination towards persons with 
disabilities but entails a much wider concept including ‘all discrimination on the basis of 
disability’ (art. 5) which is defined in art. 2 as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the 
basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”. The General Principles set on art. 3 CRPD and non-discrimination in particular (art. 
3b), ‘must permeate the whole of the Convention’ (Allain J., 2009, p. 21) and hence, art. 10, when 
interpreting it.  
 
Rodríguez Díaz, B, Mission Impossible?  Preventing discrimination on grounds of disability of foetuses with Down 
syndrome in Spain after the emergence of non-invasive prenatal testing, International Journal of Discrimination and 
the Law XX (X), pp. 1-22. Copyright © [2020] (Rodríguez Díaz, B). DOI: [10.1177/1358229120902654] 
 
 
Therefore, we argue that the distinction made in art. 15 of Act 2/2010 is a breach of the CRPD 
which, as an international treaty, is hierarchically superior to domestic law.  
Also we should bear in mind that the CRPD indicated a shift from the medical model to the 
social model of disability, that is, ‘from viewing persons with disabilities as “objects” of charity, 
medical treatment and social protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as “subjects” 
with rights, who are capable of claiming those rights and making decisions for their lives based 
on their free and informed consent as well as being active members of society’15. Therefore, 
disability is defined as an ‘evolving concept’ resulting from ‘the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others’ (CRPD preamble, e). 
If we analyse the subject of eugenic abortion on grounds of disability from the social model, 
we can clearly conclude that it is the interaction between the impairments (or the functional 
diversity of the persons) and an attitudinal barrier (a legislator decision based upon prejudices 
and biases such as the less worthy lives of people with impairments or the burden they might 
entail for their parents and the society) what prevent them to ensure their right to life protected on 
an equal basis with others (without functional diversity) (Palacios, 2010, p. 53). 
This conclusion is consistent with the interpretation made by the CRPD Committee, which 
urged Spain in 201116 to remove the distinction made in Act 2/2010 in the period allowed under 
law within which a pregnancy can be terminated based solely on disability and again in the last 
report (2019), pointing out that it contributes ‘to a climate of stigma against disability that can 
lead to discrimination’17. 
Article 15 of the Act 2/2010 is not the only way Spain is breaching the CRPD. Let us remember 
that State parties in the said Convention are not only bound not to contradict the CRPD through 
legislation (art. 4.1.a) but also to take all appropriate measures to put an end to all practices that 
constitute a discrimination on grounds of disability (art.4.1b), to make sure the public institutions 
comply with the CRPD (art.4.1.d) and also private companies and organisations (art. 4.1.e). 
As we will argue below, the healthcare provided by the national healthcare system 
discriminates on grounds of disability and therefore constitutes a breach of the CRPD on behalf 
of Spain. 
Equally, the Spanish legislation breaches other international treaties such as the Oviedo 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ratified by Spain on 23 July 1999 and published 
in the Boletín Oficial del Estado n. 251 on 20 October 1999): ‘Any form of discrimination against 
a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is prohibited’ (art. 11). Although the wording 
of art. 11 uses the term ‘person’ and we cannot consider an unborn foetus a person under domestic 
law, we support a holistic approach to this international treaty in conjunction with other treaties 
protecting general interests of the international community (Rodrigo & Abegón, 2017). Let us 
bear in mind that its purpose is to “protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and 
guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and 
fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine” (art. 1). The 
Preamble reinforces this idea as it highlights ‘the need to respect the human being both as an 
individual and as a member of the human species’ and recognises ‘the importance of ensuring the 
dignity of the human being’. The primacy of the human being is emphasised in art. 2: ‘The 
interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science’.  
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As concerns our object of study, the discrimination of foetuses with DS in their right to life in 
Spain, we argue that Act 2/2010 holds a clear discrimination on grounds of the genetic heritage 
of unborn human beings and, thus, breaches the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
 
The medical practice 
In Spain the routine screening tests provided in the early weeks of the pregnancy are prenatal 
detection techniques that require invasive techniques to accurately confirm an eventual diagnose 
of a chromosomal abnormality such as DS. The NIPT are not offered universally but only to 
women with a result of high risk of having a baby with such an abnormality according to screening 
test and only in some Autonomous Communities. 
The informed consent form given to pregnant women having a routine screening test states 
that: ‘the final goal of this test is to find out about the chromosomal integrity of my child and 
eventually to allow me to take up the Law of Voluntary Pregnancy Interruption.’18 
This statement implicitly reveals that a life with a genetic disorder or chromosomal 
abnormality such as DS is considered more likely to be terminated. Furthermore, studies have 
shown (Vargas Aldecoa, 2015, p. 238) that health practitioners in Spain encourage the termination 
for half of the cases of foetuses with DS while actively try to convince expecting mothers towards 
an abortion in a minority of cases.  
This is not happening only in Spain: more than ten years ago Dixon argued the medical 
profession was encouraging abortion of DS foetuses: ‘There are numerous contributing factors to 
what some may call a high termination rate of foetuses that have tested positive for Down 
Syndrome. One major factor is the direct and indirect influences of medical professionals, which 
include genetic counsellors, family physicians and obstetricians and gynaecologists’ (Dixon, 
2008, p. 3). 
The healthcare professionals might be influenced by successful “wrongful birth” cases in 
which different Courts have awarded damages to parents whose babies with DS were not 
diagnosed in time so allowing for termination of their pregnancy (Martínez-Pujalte, 2016, p. 160). 
On this matter both the medical practice and the judiciary are going against the CRPD, as they 
either consider the life of a foetus with DS is less likely to be accepted by prospective parents 
(and so suggesting abortion), or it is less worthy than able-lives (and hence encouraging abortion), 
or it implies an emotional and economic burden for their parents (and consequently, awarding 
damages). As we will further explain in subsequent sections, all these constitute a breach of the 
obligations assumed by Spain as State party of the CRPD (art. 4). 
 
The long-awaited ruling of the Constitutional Court regarding 
the Act 2/2010 
The Act 2/2010 was contested before the CC in 2010. While almost ten years later it has not ruled 
yet, we aim to offer a speculative analysis about the foreseeable future and to reflect briefly on 
the most likely outcomes, which are: 
- The CC may declare the Act 2/2010 is constitutional in its whole.  
- The CC may rule against considering TOP a fundamental woman’s right to be enjoyed 
in any circumstance. 
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- The CC may rule that TOP based on physical or mental impairment should be 
performed within the general deadline and not within an extended one. 
The first outcome would contradict previous constitutional doctrine affirming the life of the 
unborn child is a legal right constitutionally protected by art. 15 of our fundamental regulation. 
Regarding the life of unborn disabled children, the CC had ruled the protection given to unborn 
children’s lives should not be considered absolute. However, the grounds given by the CC to 
allow the abortion in case of physical or mental defects in 1985 made reference to the economic 
burden the baby would create due to the lack of support. This argument needs to evolve and adjust 
to the social model of disability where the economic reasons should never suffice to refuse the 
protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. As we have explained in previous sections, 
persons with disabilities can no longer be conceived as “objects” of charity, medical treatment 
and social protection but as ‘subjects” of rights.  The social model of disability ‘places the moral 
responsibility on society to remove the burdens which have been imposed, and to enable disabled 
people to participate’ (Shakespeare, 2013, p. 217). The Act 2/2010 was passed once the CRPD 
was in force in Spain and it clearly contradicts it. It is difficult to argue how to legally maintain 
this discrimination.  
In the second scenario, if the CC concludes that TOP is not a fundamental right of the pregnant 
woman to be enjoyed in any circumstance, it would mean freely terminating the pregnancy before 
a certain deadline would no longer be legal, that is, reproductive rights of the women would not 
include free abortion. If this was the case, this ruling would most likely be contested by pro-choice 
supporters, same as the adoption of Act 2/2010 was contested by pro-lifers. Both positions deserve 
to be considered but the general abortion debate surpasses the object of this paper. From the legal 
perspective, this second outcome would be consistent with previous constitutional doctrine that 
considered the life of the unborn child should be protected and only restricted in case there is a 
conflict of rights, in which case prevalence might be given to other rights. The question then 
would be to determine under which circumstances should other rights prevail over the right to life 
of the unborn child. Pregnancies due to rape or endangering the life of the pregnant woman have 
been within the circumstances allowing the abortion in former Spanish legislation. What about 
the presence of a ‘serious impairment’? As we have mentioned above, it seems difficult to 
maintain the constitutional doctrine pointing to economic reasons to limit a fundamental human 
right, since Spain has accepted the social model of disability underlying the CRPD.  
The third outcome would be formally consistent with the CRPD. However, in order to comply 
with the CRPD it will not suffice with formal equality (i.e. being given the same deadlines to 
terminate any pregnancy). Discrimination towards disabled foetuses comes also from the health 
care practice. If this scenario was to be confirmed, the NIPT could have an extraordinary impact 
in the discriminatory practices. We shall explore in detail this scenario in our conclusions.  
 
The NIPT and the vicious circle 
What are the challenges of NIPT? According the IBC: ‘The potential ethical disadvantages of 
NIPT can be summarized as routinization and institutionalization of the choice of not giving birth 
to an ill or disabled child. (...) there is the risk that pregnant women with a positive result don't 
await the validation of the result through invasive diagnostics, but immediately choose to abort 
the embryo or foetus, without adequate counselling about the relevance of the detected 
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abnormality. Also, women may feel pressured to submit to such screening. They might be 
stigmatized if they refuse to take the test’. (IBC, 2015, par. 89) 
Returning to the situation in Spain, provided the formal discrimination regarding TOP in art. 
15 Act 2/2010 is eventually removed, we would still face the mentioned challenges. As NIPT can 
provide an early 99% accurate result and they are being increasingly used in the public healthcare 
system, they could lead to a higher number of terminations of DS foetuses in the legal deadline 
without karyotype confirmation (Borrell, 2018) and without stating the cause of the termination. 
If this was the case, preventing and monitoring disability-selective abortion would be extremely 
difficult. 
In some states of the USA such as North Dakota or Ohio, abortion on grounds of a DS diagnose 
has been banned. The practical implications of this solution make it unlikely to be followed in 
Spain. If abortion is to keep being considered a fundamental right of the woman in the first 14 
weeks of the pregnancy, the actual reasons leading to a termination belong to the internal sphere 
of the expectant woman and any evidence provided by the health professionals could be easily 
disregarded. Besides, the banning of terminations on grounds of disability raises important moral 
and legal questions exceeding the object of this paper: why should we protect prenatal life? Is it 
legitimate to protect a collective (foetuses with DS) by positively discriminating them? Could we 
consider this special protection is required as the unborn population with DS are experiencing a 
sort of ‘genocide’ (López Barahona, 2016)? Why not protecting every foetus? What happens if 
the termination takes place because the unborn child doesn’t have the desired sex? Is sex-selective 
abortion acceptable? As prenatal testing, and NIPT in particular, provides wide genetic 
information, what would be the limit to accept selective terminations: a missing toe, the colour of 
the eyes, the number of foetuses? We cannot enter into this crucial debate in this paper, but it is 
very much needed. Let us recall the IBC reflection on this:  
‘Many fear that the widespread use of NIPT as general screening may induce 'eugenic' use, 
even when the state is not involved. The adding up of a lot of individual choices to the 
'acceptability' of aborting certain kinds of embryos or foetuses brings forward a societal 
phenomenon, which resembles a kind of eugenics in the search for a 'perfect child' (…) no one 
shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics and that individuals should 
be respected in their uniqueness and diversity’. (IBC, 2015, par. 93). 
What can be done to prevent selective terminations that constitute discrimination on grounds 
of disability? A complete ban of abortion in Spain doesn’t look likely to happen neither restricted 
to disabled foetuses. Besides, it has been argued that banning selective abortion would do nothing 
to ease the bias that leads to the selective abortion—and could even reinforce it: ‘the underlying 
assumption is that unless people are legally prohibited from aborting foetuses [with] disabilities, 
they will inevitably do so’ (Graham, 2018). 
If we are not to remove the choice between terminating a pregnancy or carrying it to term, the 
main thing to do to prevent disability-selective abortion is to influence this choice, to make the 
choice “real”: ‘Disabled people have argued that when a woman decides to abort a disabled foetus, 
she is not so much choosing as being constrained to take such a decision.’ (Morris, 1991, p.66). 
Facing those constraints requires ‘to challenge ingrained attitudes’ (Bunbury, 2019, p. 40) 
towards disabled foetuses, and in particular with DS. 
The best way for it is to change the communication of the diagnose. This requires both training 
professionals (compulsory under art. 4.1.i CRPD) and involving the civil society (persons with 
disabilities or their representative organisations) in the monitoring process (art. 16 CRPD). Why? 
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According Jotkowitz and Zivotofsky (2010, p. 150), ‘studies have shown that physicians are 
not well trained on how to counsel a pregnant woman whose prenatal screen suggest a high 
probability of DS or other congenital abnormalities’. Besides, ‘women are unprepared to make 
prenatal decisions about whether to abort a foetus with DS for a number of reasons. Among them 
are: societal pressure to have ‘‘normal’’ children, a disapproving view of people with disabilities, 
concern for legal liability among physicians, a lack of informed consent prior to genetic testing 
and a failure of non- judgmental pre-abortion counselling’.  
Most healthcare professionals present the diagnose of DS with sympathy and even 
encouraging termination. Language plays an important role in the communication process and 
often the information accompanying the test gives no option for choice. The State must make sure 
the health professionals are trained to offer a balanced communication of the diagnose, with the 
support of the DS organisations.  
We support a pro-information approach, to offer a more balanced portrait of the disability at 
the point of diagnosis (Graham, 2018), not hiding the challenges the DS people face but ending 
with the biases against DS. What are these biases? According Korenromp et al. (2007) the reasons 
why a DS child might not be wanted by prospective parents are: fear the burden would be too 
heavy for the child himself (83%) and he would never be able to function independently (92%); 
fear they will be too much of a burden for them as parents (64%), for their non-disabled children 
(73%) or for their relationship (55%); disappointment that the child will not meet the prospective 
life they have thought of, etc. However, there is empirical evidence of just the opposite: the 
percentage of people with DS declaring themselves happy with their lives, the way they look and 
who they are is 99% (Skotko et al., 2011a, p. 17); the siblings of people with DS show love (97%) 
and pride (87%) for their sibling with DS and even think they are a better person because of their 
brother or sister with DS (88%)  (Skotko et al. 2011b, p. 18-20); 99-97% of parents express love 
and pride towards their children with DS (Skotko et al., 2011c, p. 21), considering their family 
has been enriched positively with their child with DS (Serrano Fernández and Izuzquiza Gasset, 
2017, p. 90) and not affecting negatively marital functioning (Van Riper et al., 1992). Many 
autobiographical books (such as Beck, 1999; Groneberg, J.G, 2008, Soper KL 2009) are a 
testimony of change and happiness for having them. There is a huge contrast between expectations 
and reality as the study of How et al. (2018, p. 7) visibly shows, regarding the experience of the 
fathers of children with DS:   
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Figure 1: Journal of Intellectual Disabilities: reproduced with permission from SAGE, How 
et al., 2018.  
 
Most authors consider that biases against people with DS are a strong motivating factor lying 
behind the high rates of selective abortion. Within them, Chris Kaposi (2018a) proposes to 
“choose Down syndrome”, that is, to undo the bias against DS: ‘we don’t need new laws; we just 
need more people to choose to have such children’ (Kaposi, 2018b). He argues that ‘stigma and 
biased ways of thinking have actually been a primary cause of the push for prenatal testing and 
the high rates of termination, rather than being an effect of these practices’ (Kaposi 2018a, p. 
115). 
We argue that there is a vicious circle as the biases against DS not only influence the 
prospective parents’ decisions but also the legislation and health care routine programmes in 
Spain and vice versa. The idea of a vicious circle is also given by a well-known DS scholar, Jesús 
Flórez: ‘The cycle starts with a general negative attitude towards DS ingrained in society. It 
promotes the NIPT as a simple way to detect it. As the testing is currently performed and oriented 
towards abortion, it increases the pressure to abort and we can understand the termination figures 
provided by statistics and extensively shown by social media. This fact reinforces the negative 
vision society has about DS. All this has an impact when making an informed decision. How 
could we find a counterweight to balance the scale so parents can take a well-informed decision? 
There is only one way: showing what means to raise a child with DS and that is something only 
parents with this experience can provide, and to show the reality of what people with DS can 
become, with their intrinsic values and their strengths and weaknesses’ (Flórez, 2018, p. 50, 
author’s translation). How et al. (2018, p. 15) clearly illustrate this idea as follows: 
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Figure 2: Journal of Intellectual Disabilities: reproduced with permission from SAGE, How et 
al., 2018.  
 
As we can see, the main counterargument is providing actual information about the ‘reality of 
raising a child with DS’. However, ‘contact with parents in similar situations is an underused and 
maybe undervalued way of helping those clients’ (Korenromp et al., 2007). Hence, ‘More work 
on investigating the satisfactions associated with parenting a child with Down syndrome needs to 
be done. This is important in order that a balanced perspective can be provided to families who 
are beginning their lives as a family with a child with Down syndrome.’ (Cuskelly et al., 2009, p. 
108).  
Additionally, in order to influence the vicious circle from the point of depart of legislation, we 
must acknowledge the influence of legislation in changing attitudes. Although law struggles ‘to 
transform societal attitudes that exist’ (Bunbury, 2019, p. 31), there are successful examples, such 
as the adoption of the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944 in the UK that ‘provoked as a 
result changes in attitudes towards employing disabled people’ (Bunbury, 2019, p. 33).  
Therefore, we consider with Bunbury that a disability, and DS in particular, should be seen as 
‘positive and central part of their identity’ and thus ‘the emphasis should focus on accepting that 
each individual has different needs which is unique (Herring, 2013) and perhaps should now be 
incorporated into legislation which may assist in transforming attitudes and challenging barriers 
that limit inclusion. (…) It is clear that by changing the law, attitudes will follow. Where the law 
changes, people’s attitudes will generally change, and society will generally perceive disability as 
the «new normal»’ (Bunbury, 2019, p. 41).  
 
Conclusions 
For our conclusions, we are going to assume that the Spanish TOP legislation will only be 
modified as required by the CRPD Committee, that is, that the same deadline will apply for any 
foetus regardless of any impairment, but it will still be considered a woman’s right in the first 
fourteen weeks of the pregnancy. Should this scenario be confirmed, there are two possible 
solutions: 
First: as suggested by Kaposi, one solution could be to refuse to expand the coverage of NIPT. 
‘Public health screening programs are typically designed as a way of reducing the incidence of 
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certain diseases within a population. If a disease can be diagnosed, it can be treated; or, in the 
case of infectious diseases, transmission can be prevented. But when it comes to prenatal testing 
for DS, the only intervention currently available to reduce the incidence of this condition is 
pregnancy termination. A public-health-style screening program using NIPT would strongly 
imply that the government, as a representative of the public, has adopted the goal of eliminating 
people with DS. This message is strongly discriminatory’ (Kaposi, 2019). While we consider this 
argument to be completely right, we need to bear in mind (as Kaposi does) the advantages of the 
NIPT, and the accuracy and safety, in avoiding the risk of miscarriage. It is not the existence of 
the NIPT that contributes to discrimination towards people with DS, rather it’s the misuse of the 
NIPT. Having a prenatal diagnose can help prospective parents to adapt to the unexpected and 
unknown and to get ready for the coming challenges. As Dixon, we do not propose the elimination 
of prenatal testing, but rather ‘that the genetic testing and counselling should not be biased against 
the birth of children with disabilities. Genetic testing and counselling should not convey directly 
or indirectly the message that the lives of persons with disabilities are worth less than other lives, 
or that the only practical alternative is to prevent their existence through abortion’ (Dixon, 2008, 
p 5). A study by How et al. (2018, p.17) shows that fathers of children with DS only considered 
NIPT valuable ‘if accompanied by balanced information about Down syndrome’. 
Second: for as long as the Spanish healthcare system provides pregnancy care including 
prenatal techniques orientated to find out about chromosomal abnormalities such as DS before 
the legal deadline to terminate the pregnancy (hence the importance of the NIPT), it is the State 
responsibility:  
a) to take all appropriate measures to put an end to all practices that constitute a 
discrimination on grounds of disability (art.4.1b CRPD), and thus to change the wording 
of the informed consent form provided to expectant mothers; 
b) to make sure the public institutions comply with the CRPD (art.4.1.d CRPD) and to 
ensure the medical profession is not expressly or implicitly encouraging disability-
selective TOP but offering balanced information when communicating the diagnose. This 
obligation comprises the duty to ‘promote the training of professionals’ (art. 4.1.i CRPD) 
and to involve persons with DS through their representative organisations (compulsory 
under art. 4.3 CRPD). To fully comply with these obligations Spain should, among other 
things, provide solid genetics and ethics training for students in medical schools including 
communication of a prenatal diagnose; provide communication skills training for health 
care professionals involved in communicating the diagnose and, most importantly, ensure 
the communication process follow a protocol drafted with the participation of people with 
DS and their representative organisations; 
c) to ensure private companies and organisations comply with the CRPD (art. 4.1.e). The 
NIPT are not yet offered universally to all expectant mothers in Spain but they still have 
the choice of accessing them privately. To comply with the CRPD Spain must make sure 
that the laboratories performing the NIPT are also communicating the diagnose of a 
disability such as DS in a balanced way, following a protocol drafted by the DS 
organisations; 
d) to consider that the rulings awarding damages for “wrongful birth” constitute a breach of 
the CRPD as they imply life with a disability is less worthy and the birth of a child with 
a disability entrains a moral harm.  
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To fight against the biases concerning DS is an obligation for the States signatories of the 
CRPD such as Spain. The Committee of the CRPD accordingly recommended Spain in April 
2019 to “take measures, in partnership with self-advocacy organisations of persons with 
disabilities, to design, launch and maintain public awareness and media campaigns aimed at 
eliminating negative stereotypes towards persons with disabilities, promoting the recognition and 
respect of their rights and encouraging positive perceptions and enhanced social awareness about 
them in society” (par. 15).  
To comply with this obligation there is much to be done. A few examples of different 
initiatives that had contributed to remove the prejudice against the DS include the documentary 
film by Sara Philips, “A world without Down syndrome” (BBC Two, 2016); the Instagram 
account “Pepitamola”, with more than 240.000 followers, some of whom have later  adopted 
babies with DS; the Goya-awarded best film “Campeones” about a basketball team of people with 
intellectual disabilities; websites such as Positive about Down Syndrome; autobiographic books 
by families of children with DS, e.g. ‘Welcome to Holland’ by E.P. Kingsley; naming baby Lucas 
Warren the first Gerber baby with DS; and many other initiatives through the social media.  
The final goal of all these initiatives as well as of this study is to contribute to protect the rights 
of people with DS or other disabilities. NIPT are here to stay and most likely they will be 
increasingly used. Let us make sure they are not misused and that no one assumes that a life with 
a disability is less worth to be lived. Let us comply with the international commitments regarding 
the rights of people with disabilities. Let them live as we would do with anyone else. In their own 
words (Inclusion International, 2004): ‘(…) the lives of all future persons with disabilities, 
especially those with intellectual disabilities, are at risk because of developments in bioethics and 
prenatal testing for disability. For most persons with an intellectual disability, the disability is 
present before birth. (…) Society might soon be making a distinction between lives worth living 
and those not worth living. This is not an argument about a women’s right to choose, it is about 
“our right” to be born and to be to be different. The presence of a disability must not be allowed 
to become a justification for the termination of life, nor must a disability justify changing the 
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